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1. Introduction: How Things May Not Be Quite What 
They Seem 
The drama surrounding attempts to find a place for re-
ligion in Russia’s state-run schools unfolded after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and its official atheism.  
The drama lasted more than two decades, and involved 
tense debates, competing initiatives, and political 
struggles. Yet, at least for now, the drama seems to be 
over. In 2012, a new policy was finally put in place. 
Since then, Russian state-run schools have taught the 
“fundamentals of religious cultures.” The course re-
ceived approbation in selected regions, where nearly 
240,000 fourth graders took it, after then-president 
Dmitry Medvedev authorized the experiment in 2009. 
The course teaches four religious cultures. Only Ortho-
doxy, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism—often dubbed 
Russia’s ‘traditional’ religions—are included. All other 
faiths are not. Students can study one of these four re-
ligious cultures, choose a survey of world religions, or 
take a secular ethics course. Russia’s rulers, including 
Vladimir Putin, have supported the new curriculum, 
and there has been a push to expand it. Patriarch Kirill, 
the primate of the Russian Orthodox Church of Mos-
cow Patriarchate (ROC MP), recently spoke in favor of 
making the course mandatory for grades two through 
nine or ten.  
Existing literature has focused largely on the history 
and politics of the struggles surrounding the introduc-
tion of religion into public schooling, and—to a lesser 
extent—on the content of the new course and its text-
books, primarily the textbooks on Orthodox culture. 
This literature includes critical commentary on aspects 
of the new curriculum and its implementation (such as 
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state patriotism and the privileging of Orthodoxy). Yet 
experts have also emphasized its positive, constructive 
aspects. These are said to include consensus building; 
an open-minded search for reasonable compromise 
between the state, religious groups, and educators; 
and—particularly when contrasted with Russia’s past—
the curriculum’s multicultural, inclusive nature.  
Such evaluations evoke some of the core values 
that have shaped contemporary approaches to reli-
gious education in Western liberal democracies. As will 
be briefly discussed below, while specific policies have 
varied historically and cross-nationally, contemporary 
liberal approaches to religious education emphasize 
multicultural inclusion of diverse religious and secular 
orientations and constituencies into a shared educa-
tional and public spheres. Therefore, Russia’s educa-
tional innovations may appear to bring the country 
closer to the aforesaid Western values. I will show that 
Russia’s religious leaders—including, paradoxically, her 
staunchest proponents of the country’s civilizational 
uniqueness—wish to present the new policy in this 
light. Russia, proponents say, is simply doing what the 
West—and especially Europe—has done all along.  
This article—in contrast—shows that Russia’s new 
policies may not be quite what they seem. On the sur-
face, they display a multicultural compromise that re-
sembles a liberal-democratic model of inclusion, but—
under the surface—are supported by a neo-imperial 
regime of ethno-religious toleration that is being con-
solidated through the policies. Social scientists have 
long suggested that modern liberal-democratic forms 
of inclusion have been historically preceded by other 
ways of handling pluralism, such as through imperial 
regimes of toleration, which handled ethno-religious 
pluralism in the Russian Empire.  I suggest that a modi-
fied version of an imperial regime of toleration has 
reemerged in post-Soviet Russia. This model secures a 
hegemonic role to the Orthodox Church and identifies 
the Russian people as “first among equals” within the 
neo-imperial project that has increasingly impacted the 
ideology, politics, and foreign policy of Russia in recent 
decades. These neo-imperial orientations, I argue, 
manifest themselves in the policy arrangements and 
content of the new course on religious cultures. 
Meanwhile, the idea of multi-cultural inclusion of di-
verse religious groups is used to legitimize the new pol-
icies by making them presentable and acceptable to 
Western critics. 
I approach this task as a social scientist. My goal is 
not to criticize or praise Russian policies, but to show 
how these policies are shaped by the Russian and Sovi-
et imperial legacies, and how the choices and strate-
gies of Russia’s religious and secular elites have con-
tributed to a neo-imperial model of ethno-religious 
toleration. In particular, I link the emergence of this 
model to elites’ decision to use a top-down approach 
to reviving religion (i.e., desecularizing) in Russia’s insti-
tutions. This paper incorporates conceptualizations of 
empire, imperial toleration, and desecularization with 
qualitative discourse analysis of five Russian textbooks 
and a Manual for teachers. The analysis shows how the 
neo-imperial model manifests itself in the texts’ content. 
This article begins by briefly outlining the core ideas 
around which a consensus on religious education 
seems to have emerged in liberal democracies. I then 
provide an overview of how Russia has approached re-
ligious education, how religious education policies have 
been presented by Russian leaders, and how experts 
have identified these policies with modern Western 
practices. This section is followed by an analysis of the 
imperial and neo-imperial political and ideological con-
text of Russia’s policies. I build on desecularization 
theory and research to suggest that Russia’s religious 
and secular leaders have opted for a desecularization 
“from above”, which has led to the re-emergence of a 
neo-imperial pattern of religious hegemony and limited 
toleration of ethno-religious pluralism. Finally, I show 
how these neo-imperial orientations have manifested 
in the ideological context of the new textbooks. 
2. Liberal Democratic Consensus in Religious 
Education 
In order to understand how the emerging Russian 
model of religious education differs from the model in 
Western liberal democracies, let us look at the nature 
of the model around which Western democracies have 
built consensus. There is no doubt that existing ap-
proaches to and forms of religious education in West-
ern liberal democracies vary historically, cross-
nationally, and intra-nationally. These variations reflect 
the different patterns of historical church-state and 
church-state-and-school relations in democratic socie-
ties (Monsma & Soper, 1997); prevalent models for 
regulating religion in the public sphere, including in ed-
ucation (Richardson, 2004; Plesner, 2005a); and coun-
try-specific historical trajectories and institutional ar-
rangements for integrating religious minorities (Fetzer 
& Soper, 2005). In the US, the First Amendment to the 
Constitution and the country’s strict separation of 
church and state placed religious education beyond the 
scope of public education. In most of Europe, religious 
education has been incorporated in public school cur-
ricula. Generally speaking, models of religious educa-
tion in Europe include:  
(a) teaching religion as a separate and official 
school subject, a subject for which the state 
may have sole responsibility (as in the UK 
and Norway) or co-responsibility with the 
churches (as in most German states); 
(b) offering religion outside formal curricula, 
and under the control of the church or 
other faith communities (as in the German 
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states of Brandenburg and Berlin); and  
(c) teaching religious traditions within history, 
social studies, or other subjects (e.g., in 
France with exception of Alsace-Lorraine) 
(Plesner, 2005b, p. 1).  
Approaches to religious education in public schools 
vary in many other ways, such as in whether one 
teaches in, for, or about religion; whether one presents 
the subject as a devotion or confessional; whether one 
teaches students in segregated or integrated class-
rooms; and whether one offers religious education as 
an elective or mandatory course (e.g., Jackson et al., 
2007; Lahnemann & Schreiner, 2009). Similarly com-
plex and diversified is the landscape of forms and ap-
proaches to religious education in liberal democracies 
outside of Europe. Thus in most Australian states, reli-
gious instruction remains an important feature of pub-
lic school curricula, while the schools of Canadian On-
tario teach religion in a neutral way, and Quebec just 
introduced religious education as a subject for primary 
and secondary schools in 2008 (for a survey of non-
European approaches to religious education, see—for 
example—Beaman & Van Arragon, 2015). Yet amidst 
the growing religious and cultural diversity of the 
Western world, the need to develop a set of interna-
tional principles and standards (compatible with basic 
democratic principles) for incorporating religion into 
public education became pressing, and commonly rec-
ognized among the West’s educational administrations 
and scholarly communities. Europe took a leading role 
in developing these principles. Despite the considera-
ble plurality of conceptualizations, institutionalizations, 
and practices of religious education in European de-
mocracies,  
“there have been several significant European-wide 
developments that aim toward the creation of a 
more general, trans-national consensus regarding 
the rationale and guidelines for RE [religious educa-
tion—E.L.] in public schools. These developments 
include public statements and research activities 
sponsored by the European Union, projects and 
documents developed by the Council of Europe, 
and initiatives undertaken by the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).” 
(Grelle, 2015, pp. 236-237) 
A consensus regarding religious education has been 
reached during these activities, and endorsed in the 
Toledo Guiding Principles of Teaching about Religions 
and Beliefs in Public Schools (OSCE, 2007).  The consen-
sus serves as “a basis for the study of religions in edu-
cational institutions across Europe and beyond that is 
not driven by any theological agenda, but rather re-
lates to human rights, citizenship and intercultural ed-
ucation arguments” (Jackson, 2010, p. vii). This consen-
sus is not about a particular form of religious educa-
tion, but about the general principles and framework 
within which particular jurisdictions should design their 
specific forms of religious incorporation in curricula. 
This framework is grounded in the democratic values of 
human rights and religious freedom. It establishes in-
ternational standards that prohibit violations of these 
rights, and prevent indoctrination of students into any 
particular system of religious values or dogmas. Van 
Arragon and Beaman suggest modern democracies 
agree that a country’s chosen model should cause no 
harm to religious or non-religious minorities “by prac-
tices they experience as coercive indoctrination” (2015, 
pp. 3-4).  They emphasize that, particularly in public 
schools, “the quest is for a mechanism which will both 
protect the religious freedoms of religious groups while 
at the same time persuading students to see their reli-
gions and religious traditions in the context of wider, 
commonly accepted civic values and interests” (p. 3).  
These guiding principles give public schools the 
charge to accommodate religious constituencies with re-
spect to their rights and freedoms, and—by doing so—
help build inter-religious and “intercultural understand-
ing, tolerance and harmony (Weisse, 2007, p. 17). The 
sociologist Jean-Paul Willaime (2007) notes that, “what-
ever their legal framework, all European countries are 
facing the question of how to approach religious faith 
respecting the freedom of conscience of students and 
their families while at the same time educating them 
towards freedom of thought and a critical stance” (p. 
100). As such, religious education (as education about 
and from religions) is perceived by leading European 
scholars as another form of civic education, which facili-
tates the development of European and global values of 
citizenship and cultural pluralism (Jackson, 2003, 2007). 
Thus it seems that—amidst the diversity of national, so-
cio-historical, and legal contexts, and in the varied forms 
of religion’s delivery into schools—there is indeed a con-
sensus on principles and desirable outcomes. 
This developing consensus is a commonly shared 
approach, and is rooted in the cornerstone principles 
of liberal democracy. It views the harmonious unity of 
diverse groups as a result of policies and structural ar-
rangements that are based on respect for religious 
freedom, choice, and cultural self-determination. Find-
ings from the EU-funded research project, Religion in 
Education. A Contribution to Dialogue or a Factor of 
Conflict in Transforming societies of European Coun-
tries, 2006–2009 (REDCo), suggest that this approach 
succeeds, and brings desirable outcomes. Thus it was 
found that students from countries with different, even 
polar, models of religious education (e.g., English ver-
sus French) reported that at school they “learn to re-
spect everyone, whatever their religion” (Jozsa, 2010, 
p. 43). The liberal democratic approach respects free-
dom of critical thought, which precludes hegemonic 
imposition of religious views and ascription of religious 
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identities. And it is in this regard, we will see, that the 
liberal democratic approach differs from the emerging 
Russian model. However, in order to see how and why 
the Russian model is different, let us look at how the 
model developed and at its essential traits. 
3. Teaching Religious Cultures: A Brief History and 
Basic Facts  
By all historical accounts, attempts to find a place for 
religion in public schooling date back to the fall of the 
Soviet rule and the emergence of post-Soviet Russia; 
that is, they date back to the end of the 1980s and the 
early 1990s.  Some highly positioned members of the 
political, administrative, intellectual, and religious 
elites lobbied for and contributed to the process of in-
troducing religions into schools. The process lasted 
more than two decades, and has gone through a num-
ber of dramatic stages. It was marked by considerable 
struggles between the forces that promoted and sup-
ported a (re)introduction of religious education and 
those who opposed it (see Lisovskaya & Karpov, 2005, 
2010, for an analysis of the social and political dynam-
ics of the struggle). The ROC MP, Russia’s largest and 
most influential religious organization, played a key 
role in the process. Initially, the ROC MP insisted on 
teaching only one course, on Orthodox Culture. In 
2002, Minister of Education Filippov signed an order in-
troducing the course on Orthodox Culture into the 
basic curricula of municipal schools. A highly contro-
versial textbook, Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture—
written by Alla Borodina—became the first educational 
text taught in the course. One year later, in 2003, after 
receiving heavy criticism for privileging Orthodoxy in a 
religiously diverse society, Filippov suggested develop-
ing a course on multiple religions instead. Orthodox hi-
erarchs strongly objected to the suggestion; in their 
pursuit to preserve a separate course on Orthodoxy, 
they began lobbying for a confessional model of reli-
gious education, which would allow students to be 
taught their religious preference in separate class-
rooms (Vasilenko, 2005). These hierarchs might have 
calculated that, in a country where a vast majority of 
citizens (up to 80%, according to some polls) identified 
themselves as Orthodox, a similarly vast majority of 
parents and students would opt for a course on Ortho-
dox Culture; the expectation did not, however, quite 
materialize. In 2007—through amendments to educa-
tion law—local and regional curricular components 
were abolished, leaving public schools bound only by 
the federally mandated curricular standard. The same 
year, the ROC MP leadership—in collaboration with the 
Ministry of Education—expanded the federal standard 
by establishing a new curricular area called Spiritual-
Moral Development of Russia’s Citizens; the course on 
religious cultures became the first taught within this 
new division.  
The process culminated in the development and 
implementation of a course called the Fundamentals of 
Religious Cultures and Secular Ethics (FRCSE), which 
was introduced as a mandatory component under the 
Federal Educational Standard through the directives of 
President Medvedev (August 2, 2009) and the Gov-
ernment of the Russian Federation (October 29, 2009). 
The course was taught on a trial basis in nineteen re-
gions of the country in 2009–2010, and introduced in 
two more regions (the Mari Republic and Yaroslavl re-
gion) in 2011. Some observers noted that the course 
had been taught de facto in selected regions of the 
country long before it became mandatory (Glanzer & 
Petrenko, 2007). In February 2012, then Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin praised the experiment, and approved 
its expansion at a meeting with the religious leaders of 
Russia’s major confessions while at the Danilov Monas-
tery in Moscow (Stenogramma, 2012). After his appro-
bation, the course was launched in all state-run general 
education schools. Since 2012, teachers have been re-
quired to teach the course to all fourth graders for one 
hour per week (34 hours total). The ROC MP leadership 
is currently pushing to expand the course, making it a 
requirement for almost the whole of elementary and 
secondary school (grades two through nine or ten). 
How does the newly instituted approach work? Stu-
dents and/or their parents are allowed to choose be-
tween six modules, five of which have an explicitly reli-
gious focus, and one of which is dedicated to secular 
ethics. There is one textbook for each module, and one 
instructional Manual for teachers (Tishkov & Shaposhni-
kova, 2011). The texts focusing on religions include: 
Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture (FOC) (Kuraev, 2012), 
Fundamentals of Islamic Culture (FIC) (Latyshina & Mur-
tazin, 2012), Fundamentals of Judaic Culture (FJC) 
(Chlenov, Mindrina, & Glotser, 2012), Fundamentals of 
Buddhist Culture (FBC) (Chimitdorzhiev, 2012), Funda-
mentals of World Religious Cultures (FWRC) (Beglov, 
Saplina, Tokareva, & Yarlykapov, 2012), and Fundamen-
tals of Secular Ethics (FSE) (no author, 2012). These text-
books have been written by individuals who held posi-
tions in both secular and religious institutions (Basil, 
2013, p. 733), have been approved by the Ministry of 
Education Coordinating Council, and were published by 
the largest state-controlled publishing house (Prosvesh-
chenie) in 2012. Authored by Daniliuk and identical in all 
textbooks, the first and last lessons articulate the 
course’s general goals and patriotic ideals in language 
understandable to fourth-graders. Later in this article, I 
present findings from critical discourse analysis of five of 
these textbooks (the ones dealing with specific religious 
cultures). The findings reveal the latent ideological con-
tent of the textbooks, and shed light on the new 
course’s ‘hidden curriculum’, to use a term from sociolo-
gy of education. However, let us first look at the new 
curriculum’s manifestly proclaimed goals and principles 
as they were articulated by its promoters and advocates. 
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4. Legitimizing the New Curriculum 
As mentioned above, the introduction of the new poli-
cy involved serious political struggles. Resistance and 
criticism came mainly in two forms. First, there was vo-
ciferous and energetic resistance from secular intellec-
tuals, educators, opposition politicians, and human 
rights activists. The second type of serious resistance 
came from Muslim leaders (see Lisovskaya & Karpov, 
2010) and other minority religious groups who feared 
the new arrangements would further disadvantage 
them by privileging Orthodoxy. Remarkably, since the 
criticisms came from very different angles, both sides’ 
arguments against bringing religion into schools em-
phasized the constitutionally secular nature of the Rus-
sian state and Russian education, as well as the need to 
protect religious freedom and human rights. These ar-
guments resonated with the values of Western liberal 
democracies; it is therefore no accident that official 
advocates of the new curriculum chose to focus on 
precisely these Western values.  
Telling is the following statement by the ROC MP’s 
then official spokesman, archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin—
former chairman of the Synodal Department for the 
Cooperation of Church and Society and a member of 
the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation: 
“Proposed by the President, [Dmitry Medvedev at 
the time—E.L.] the model of teaching religious cul-
tures is based on the principle of free choice and 
has long been established in most countries of Eu-
rope and the world and everywhere contributes not 
only to the moral upbringing of people, but also to 
the strengthening of inter-religious and inter-ethnic 
harmony and cooperation.” (Chaplin, 2009) 
The emphasis here is clearly on free choice, religious 
liberty, and inter-religious harmony, which, along with 
the explicit reference to the European and global expe-
rience, implies that Russia would join the club of civi-
lized Western liberal democracies by introducing the 
new religious education policy. Chaplin further stated 
that the new approach “satisfies interests of practically 
all religious groups and the groups with different world 
views that are actually [emphasis added—E.L.] repre-
sented in our society” (Chaplin, 2009). Let us note that 
the ‘actually’ represented groups do not include 
Protestants, Catholics, and many other established and 
new religious groups who are present in Russia and ex-
cluded from the new arrangement. The exclusionary 
and discriminatory aspect of this policy has been per-
sistently glossed over by its advocates.  
The same line of argument was presented by an-
other ROC leader, Hilarion Alfeyev, the Metropolitan of 
Volokolamsk and Chairman of the Department of Ex-
ternal Church Relations of the ROC:  
“In Europe, and particularly in Germany, teaching 
spiritual and moral subjects is a common practice, 
in spite of the heated debates surrounding it. It is 
gratifying that in our country religious education in 
coming back to the school system after a long 
break.” (Alfeyev, 2010) 
Proponents of the new course also included in their 
rhetoric appeals to Russia’s Law on Education, which 
was originally formulated in the early, relatively liberal 
climate of the post-Soviet transition. In particular, the 
Law states that, 
“the content of education must contribute to mu-
tual understanding and cooperation among people 
and nations irrespective of their racial, national, 
ethnic, religious and social affiliation; it has to ac-
commodate the diversity of world outlooks and 
help students to exercise their right to the free 
choice of opinions and convictions.” (Law on Educa-
tion, 14 [4]) 
Following this logic, the Conception for the Spiritual-
Moral Development of Russia’s Citizens—the founda-
tional document behind the new course (Daniliuk, 
Kondakov, & Tishkov, 2009)—promises that religious 
education will help future citizens of the Russian Fed-
eration internalize “the values of tolerance created on 
the grounds of inter-confessional dialogue” (p. 18). 
Under such an interpretation, the new curriculum 
perfectly matches the values and expectations for reli-
gious education in Western democracies, which I dis-
cussed earlier. And—compared to the not so distant 
Soviet past, where religions were almost entirely sup-
pressed, and even against earlier plans to introduce on-
ly Orthodox education in multi-religious Russia—the 
new policy does appear an important advancement 
towards religious liberty and multiculturalism. Not sur-
prisingly, as we will see below, experts in Russia and 
the West have noted and emphasized these remarka-
ble developments. 
5. Expert Evaluations 
Writing before the introduction of the new curriculum, 
Kozyrev and Fedorov (2007) raised the following theo-
retical possibilities of Russia’s development in the area 
of religious education. Since contemporary Russian cul-
ture is rooted, they said, in “a common European cul-
tural and religious heritage,…one might expect that the 
new global challenges facing Russia today will bring to 
life the same social, cultural and scientific develop-
ments as in the West and that that would result in 
growing partnerships and mutual understandings with 
European states” (p. 133). Yet their assessment of the 
place of religious education in Russia was inconclusive. 
On the one hand, they suggested that an increased role 
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for religious education in Russia might contribute to in-
ter-religious dialogue. However, on the other hand, 
and given the history of post-totalitarianism in Russia, 
the introduction of religious education could become 
“a factor of conflict” (p. 155). Against the background 
of this cautious assessment, later Russian evaluations 
of recent developments in religious education have 
been far more positive. For example, Romanova (2013) 
says that the course fits the “fundamental principle” of 
building “unity in diversity,” which “reflects the social, 
ethnic, cultural, and religious complexity of Russia and 
the modern world” (p. 293). Overall, since the intro-
duction of the course, criticisms by Russian experts 
have become less noticeable, which can be attribut-
ed—at least in part—to growing compliance with a 
new, far more authoritarian, ideological mainstream.  
Development and implementation of the new poli-
cy did not escape the attention of Western observers 
(see Basil, 2013; Clay, 2015; Glanzer, 2005; Glanzer & 
Petrenko, 2007; Loya, 2006, 2008; Willems, 2007, 
2012). The course’s multi-module, multi-religious, and 
multicultural structure, and its elective nature have 
been generally appreciated by observers, and inter-
preted within the discourse of accommodation for reli-
gious diversity and religious freedom. Thus, before the 
course was introduced in its present six-module struc-
ture, Willems (2007) argued that “schools must ensure 
that the other large or traditional religions can be of-
fered similar instructions” to properly address the issue 
of religious freedom (p. 241). After its introduction, the 
six-module course structure was described as “the cor-
rect formula”, signifying that many Russian leaders had 
the “capacity to compromise on this very difficult is-
sue,” as well as openness “to the idea of turning away 
from a tradition of ideological or ecclesiastical domi-
nance, prevalent during the Romanov and Soviet eras,” 
and a readiness “to follow a path where cooperation 
and negotiation replace the demands of one omnipo-
tent opinion” (Basil, 2015, p. 739). Clay (2015) also 
notes the new curriculum’s multicultural nature. Yet he 
suggests that the new Russian model of religious edu-
cation “strikingly resembles the state-sponsored hier-
archy of religions in the nineteenth-century Russian 
Empire. Increasingly, the Russian state actively cooper-
ates with certain favored religious organizations, la-
belled “traditional,” to achieve its social and political 
goals” (Clay, 2015, p. 44). This observation adds an im-
portant dimension to existing evaluations of the Rus-
sian model as convergent or inconsistent with the 
above described consensus on the place of religious 
education in liberal democracies. The Russian experi-
ence can and should be compared with Western mod-
els, yet its nature becomes clearer when we observe it 
in the context of Russia’s own history, going back well 
beyond the relatively short post-Soviet and even Soviet 
past. Below, I take this point a step further, and sug-
gest that Russia’s emerging model can be described as 
neo-imperial—not only in its reliance on selected ‘tra-
ditional’ organizations, but also in its recreation of an 
imperial mode towards handling ethno-religious plural-
ism. This, we will see, is reflected not only in the course 
structure, but also in its ideological content. Thus, let 
us look at Russia’s new model of religious education in 
the context of the country’s imperial history and its 
neo-imperial aspirations. 
6. Russia’s Imperial Legacies and Aspirations 
Among the many factors that have shaped Russia’s ap-
proach to religious education, a most important and 
perhaps most overlooked one is the country’s imperial 
legacies and the neo-imperial aspirations of its current 
leadership, political and religious. Historically, what we 
now know as the Russian Federation was once the core 
of two empires, Russian and Soviet. Moreover, its eth-
no-territorial composition and current “vertical” struc-
ture of governance is a remnant of these empires. And 
in the last twenty years (and increasingly in the last few 
years), Russia’s ruling regime has worked to rebuild 
and regain its partly lost imperial might. 
There have been debates as to how one should de-
fine empire. Yale H. Ferguson (2008) lists four main ap-
proaches for how one might identify an empire, all use-
ful in some way. One approach simply compares the 
questionable empire to indisputable ones. Thus, a po-
litical entity can be considered an empire if it is similar 
to the Roman, Ottoman, or Tsarist Russian empires. To 
use Giorgio Agamben’s (2009) term, the known singu-
lar cases serve as “paradigms” that help to recognize 
and understand unique cases while avoiding generali-
zations. The second approach delves more into what 
constitutes the essence of empirically existing empires, 
and attempts to give a general, “ideal type” definition. 
The third, “constructivist” approach relies on opinion 
and perception. To simplify, it holds that an entity is an 
empire if it is broadly perceived as one. Finally, the 
fourth, “normative” approach treats a polity as an em-
pire in order to praise it or resist and change it (Fergu-
son, 2008, pp. 272-273). One could argue that Russia is 
an empire under all four criteria, but—for the purpose 
of this paper—let me limit the discussion to the first 
two. First, pre-Soviet Russia is among the aforesaid 
paradigmatic examples, and its Soviet version is com-
monly seen by social scientists as a modified reincarna-
tion of the Tsarist original. In its present form, Russia is 
the largest remnant of both, and its ethno-territorial 
structure and even ethno-religious composition are 
part of its imperial legacy of conquest and colonization. 
Furthermore, the Russian Federation largely fits ideal-
typical definitions, such as Motyl’s (1999) structural 
definition:  
“Empires…are structurally centralized political sys-
tems within which core states and elites dominate 
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peripheral societies, serve as intermediaries for 
their significant interactions, and channel resource 
flows from the periphery to the core and back to 
the periphery.” (Motyl, 1999, p. 126) 
When the Soviet Union was near its death, and shortly 
after its demise in 1991, Russian leaders appealed to 
regional authorities to take, in the famous words of 
then president Yeltsin, “as much sovereignty as you 
can swallow.” This was instrumental in undermining 
the centralized structure of Soviet control, and for a 
short while, centrifugal tendencies were tolerated by 
the relatively weak central government of post-Soviet 
Russia. Yet a rude awakening followed when Moscow’s 
bloody war in Chechnya set very clear limits on any as-
pirations for regional and ethno-territorial sovereignty. 
With Putin’s rise to power, structural, imperial-style 
centralization accelerated. Since 2004, regional gover-
nors have been appointed by Moscow, and the practice 
of rebuilding a “vertical of power” has continued and 
intensified. Political discourse glorifying Russia’s impe-
rial legacy, including its Soviet hypostasis has become 
mainstream. Even so-called “liberals” and market re-
formers like Anatoly Chubais have proclaimed the crea-
tion of a “liberal empire” (Chubais, 2003). In recent 
years, military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine 
and the annexation of Crimea made Russia’s neo-
imperial aspirations even clearer. Russia has reverted 
to imperial models after a short-lived attempt to 
change to de-centralized, democratic modes of gov-
ernance and center-periphery relations. Its political 
structure and current prevailing orientations can thus 
be legitimately called neo-imperial, and it is in this con-
text that we will look at the re-emergence of the old, 
albeit modified, imperial practices of handling ethno-
religious pluralism in education. 
7. Patterns of Dealing with Religious Diversity in 
Imperial and Neo-Imperial Russia 
A closer look at how religious and ethno-religious di-
versity was handled in the Russian and Soviet empires 
will give us better insight into the nature of the new 
model of religious education in contemporary Russia.  
7.1. The Russian Empire before 1917 
In the Russian Empire, ethnic and religious identities 
were closely interrelated. Russians were Orthodox; 
Chechens, Tatars, and Kazakhs were Muslims; Buryats 
and Kalmyks were Buddhists; and so on (e.g., Willems, 
2007, p. 232). Religious identity was practically as-
signed at birth, and was considered a valid indicator of 
one’s ethnicity. Furthermore, these faiths and identi-
ties represented a hierarchical system with the ROC at 
the top. “The Russian legal code, systematized in the 
mid-nineteenth century, established a hierarchy of a 
handful of recognized religions” (Clay, 2015, pp. 47-48). 
In this hierarchy, the next, lower level was taken by 
other Christian confessions (inoslavie), such as the Ap-
ostolic Church, the Evangelical Lutheran Church, and 
the Roman Catholic Church. Judaism, Islam, and Bud-
dhism (inoverie) were positioned at an even lower lev-
el, with different kinds of pagans occupying the bottom 
level (p. 48). Furthermore, and very importantly for this 
article’s argument, the Russian Empire had what soci-
ologists of religion would call a monopolistic division of 
religious markets prior to 1917. Religious adherents be-
longed to historically distinct and—typically—
geographically separated ethnic groups. This meant 
that ethnic and religious identities were closely linked, 
not only to one another, but also to a particular and 
clearly demarcated territory. To put it differently, eth-
nic divisions in the country coincided with religious and 
territorial divisions. Thus the Russian Orthodox ethno-
religious majority group occupied the central part of 
the empire while minority ethno-religious groups lived 
on its periphery. Minority groups belonged to particu-
lar territories because they were colonized by the em-
pire at different times in its consolidation. Thus Mus-
lims dwelled either in Central Asia, North Caucasus, 
Crimea, or the Volga river Basin (Bulgaria); Buddhists 
lived in traditional regions south of the Ural mountains 
(Kalmykia) or in the Baikal region (Buryatia and Tuva); 
Lutherans lived to the north and west from the imperi-
al capitals (Finland and Estonia). The fact that the first 
synagogue, first mosque, and first Buddhist temple 
were all opened in St. Petersburg—the capital of Rus-
sian Empire—only at the turn of the twentieth century 
(in 1888, 1913, and 1915 respectively) suggests that 
minority ethno-religious groups were not welcomed 
and did not settle in the Orthodox parts of the empire. 
Within this ethno-religious-territorial structure, minori-
ty religions were tolerated in that they were allowed to 
be practiced and even taught in schools, though within 
clearly demarcated geographical boundaries. Thus, Ta-
tar children received Islamic instruction in Kazan and 
Crimea, Finns received instruction in Lutheranism in 
Finland, and Russian children were instructed in Or-
thodoxy everywhere they resided.  
This system was a particular, imperial “regime of 
toleration,” to borrow Michael Walzer’s term (1997, p. 
14). In multinational empires like Persia or Rome, 
Walzer explains, various cultural and religious groups 
could entertain a certain level of legal autonomy, ruling 
themselves “across a considerable range of their activi-
ties” (1997, p. 14). They co-existed with one another 
because they had no other choice, and because their 
“interactions [were] governed by imperial bureaucrats 
in accordance with an imperial code…designed to 
maintain some minimal fairness, as fairness is under-
stood in the imperial center” (1997, p. 14). He consid-
ers this regime of imperial toleration the most histori-
cally successful at dealing with the problem of religious 
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diversity (p. 15). When taxes were paid and groups did 
not openly object to the central authority, peaceful co-
existence among groups could be maintained. Howev-
er, Walzer argues that—in comparison with a liberal 
democracy— this type of regime is nothing more than 
autocratic and discriminatory, and can become “brutal-
ly repressive” (p. 15). Moreover, as shown by Barkey 
(2014) in her comparative study of the Habsburg and 
Ottoman Empires, a positive relationship between an 
empire and toleration of diversity should not be as-
sumed. Toleration of diversity is not essential to impe-
rial states (or regimes); diverse groups are incorpo-
rated for economic and/or political expediency, and 
states would not hesitate to engage in “serious perse-
cution of minority populations” should there be a 
change in pragmatic orientation (p. 227).  
It is difficult to doubt that the Russian Empire rep-
resents an imperial mode towards the toleration of di-
versity. Historians like Geraci and Khodarkovsky (2001) 
clearly show the applicability of Walzer’s concept to 
Tsarist Russia, even though they do not use Walzer’s 
term. In Tsarist Russia, taxes were paid and religious 
minorities functioned within prescribed territorial 
boundaries and within a centrally defined legal code; 
minority religions were taught in regional schools and 
indigenous languages under the supervision of local re-
ligious communities and organizations. Yet—grounded 
in the imperial model of separating ethno-religious 
groups into territorial enclaves on the outskirts of the 
country, and of relegating them a silent minority status 
under the bureaucratic control of the central authori-
ty—this regime represented a distinctly autocratic ap-
proach to handling cultural and religious diversity and 
enforcing peaceful co-existence. 
7.2. The Soviet Empire 
After 1917, schools became thoroughly atheistic. No 
religion was taught as a subject in its own right, and re-
ligion could not be incorporated within other subjects 
like history or literature, at least through the 1960s. In 
the 1980s, and closer to the collapse, some minimal 
knowledge of religions was given to students through 
courses on world and Russian history (Lukhovitskiy, 
2005, p. 147). Although it was difficult to completely 
exclude references to religions when teaching the hu-
manities, any positive references to religious life or 
thought were ridiculed, banned, or excluded from legit-
imate educational discourse. In this sense, the Soviet 
model was even more secularized than the laical ap-
proach developed in France, which—according to Wil-
laime (2007)—is not alien to incorporating religious 
themes within the humanities and social studies (p. 
64). As such, the Soviet school represents a truly ex-
treme case of opposition to confessional or denomina-
tional teaching.  
Being totally a-religious and anti-religious, the Sovi-
et schools did not have to address the issue of religious 
diversity; religious diversity was no longer an issue. Re-
ligious life was suppressed all over the country, and ex-
isting cultural diversity no longer had a manifestly reli-
gious dimension. Thus the Soviet imperial regime did 
not have to exhibit toleration of religious diversity. Alt-
hough religions were still practiced around the country, 
the state effectively and overtly exhibited intolerance 
towards religion. True, the intolerance was applied se-
lectively: some churches (such as the ROC MP) were 
less suppressed than others (such as the Baptists or 
Greco-Catholics), and the selectivity resembled—to a 
degree—the pre-1917 hierarchical structure.  
However, cultural diversity was effectively reduced 
to ethnic differences. Even within that realm, diversity 
was supposed to be limited; cultures could be national 
in their form, but official doctrine stipulated that cul-
tures be socialist in their content. Soviet approaches to 
handling diversity evolved over time, yet they invaria-
bly aimed at suppressing ethno-national self-
determination. This suppression included massive and 
forced russification of ethnic republics and regions, as 
well as forced relocation of ethnic groups, which 
changed the ethno-territorial composition of the coun-
try considerably; the country’s composition became 
more complex and mixed than it was before the revo-
lution. In addition to deportations and other forced re-
locations, the Soviet industrialization and urbanization 
increased geographic mobility, leading to greater eth-
nic heterogeneity in large cities. However, these 
changes did not eliminate the challenge of ethno-
religious diversity, which continued to exist, albeit in a 
suppressed way. Russification of the republics poten-
tially involved their Orthodoxization, further reinforc-
ing the minority status of non-Orthodox ethnic groups. 
Moreover, this mixing of cultures and ethnicities within 
regions prepared the ground for future tensions and 
conflicts, including ones that surrounded religious edu-
cation in public schools after the collapse of com-
munism (Lisovskaya & Karpov, 2010).  
7.3. Postcommunist Russia 
As the Soviet order and its official atheism collapsed, 
the return of religion to the public sphere raised with 
renewed vigor the question of religious diversity. Rus-
sia’s handling of religious diversity has reflected the 
prevalent pattern of its desecularization. Sociologists 
use the term “desecularization” (Berger, 1999) to de-
note the process by which religion reasserts its societal 
influence after a period of secularization. The process 
is not self-propelled. Actors and activists initiate and 
promote it in the direction that best serves their inter-
ests and visions. Depending on the actors involved, 
desecularization of public institutions may develop 
“from above” and “from below” (Karpov, 2010, 2013). 
In Russia, the predominant pattern of the return of re-
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ligion to the public sphere, including in education, was 
“from above.” In other words, it was carried out 
through an alliance of religious and political elites with 
minimal and rigidly controlled grassroots participation 
(Lisovskaya & Karpov, 2005, 2010). In the aftermath of 
the Soviet collapse, religious elites—especially those of 
the ROC MP—faced a formidable challenge. They 
needed to reassert their dominant role in society, 
but—after seven decades of atheistic suppression—
their actual flock was negligibly small, a fact which un-
dermined the legitimacy of any claims they might make 
to religious domination. Under these circumstances, 
the ROC MP leadership and other leading religious 
groups chose the path of least resistance and most ef-
ficacy. Specifically, they attempted to “reclaim” their 
positions of domination by re-attaching religion to eth-
nicity (Karpov, 2013, p.16). This meant that the ROC 
MP claimed all ethnic Russians as part of its flock re-
gardless of whether ‘the flock’ had been baptized, at-
tended church services, or believed in Orthodox teach-
ing.  Similarly, Russia’s Muslim leadership could claim 
Chechens, Ingushs, Tatars, Bashkirs, and other histori-
cally Islamic people as Muslims, regardless of these 
peoples’ religiosity or lack thereof. Buddhism was rele-
gated to Kalmyks, Buryats, and Tuvins; Judaism was 
relegated to Jews, and so on. This, again, was the 
shortest path to reasserting the dominant societal po-
sition of these religious groups. For minority religions, 
i.e., non-Orthodox ones, this path was the only way to 
re-establish recognition, status, and control vis-à-vis 
the ROC MP, which claimed dominance within the hi-
erarchy of post-Soviet religions. The path also allowed 
control of any competition on the religious market, and 
helped keep any outsiders out. In other words, this was 
a way to prevent and suppress any “exogenous and 
endogenous religious pluralism” (p. 11). The exogenous 
threat was—in particular—associated with American 
and other Protestant missionaries, who enthusiastically 
turned their steps to evangelize Russia in the mid-
1980s, and were initially received there with great fer-
vor. Endogenous pluralism developed from within as 
deviations from the official versions of Orthodoxy, Is-
lam, and other faiths (Burdo & Filatov, 2004; Mitrokhin, 
2004; Papkova, 2011). For example, mass conversions 
to Pentecostalism in Siberia and the Far East (territo-
ries perceived as canonically Orthodox) represented 
both an exogenous and endogenous threat to the ROC 
MP domination. The high rate of conversions, in par-
ticular, led to changes in legislation on religion (Shterin, 
2012). Trying to minimize the challenge of pluralism, 
the ROC MP leadership lobbied for “The Freedom of 
Conscience and Religious Associations”, which was 
passed in 1997 and privileged Orthodoxy, Islam, Bud-
dhism, and Judaism as Russia’s traditional faiths. All 
other religions were deemed ‘non-traditional’, and 
their rights were curtailed. Especially disadvantaged 
were the newly arriving or re-emerging groups affiliat-
ed with Protestant and other Western religions, such 
as the Salvation Army, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, 
and many others. The definition of ‘traditional’ reli-
gions or religious organizations is missing from the law. 
However, it may be found in the Manual for teachers 
of religious cultures (Tishkov & Shaposhnikova, 2011). 
Traditional religions are there defined as those that 
have been “transmitted from one generation to anoth-
er within a particular entity of people. They develop 
within ethnic or state-defined boundaries” (p. 203). 
This definition clearly resonates with the ethno-
territorial religious divisions of the Russia Empire. The 
2015 edition of the 1997 law reinforces this resem-
blance by stipulating that a religious organization may 
be established by “the citizens permanently living on 
the same territory or in one settlement of urban or ru-
ral type” (Amendments to the 1997 Law, 2015). The 
logical outcome of this strategy was a reestablishment 
(albeit a modified one) of the imperial model for deal-
ing with religious diversity. The boundaries of religious 
communities have once again become co-extensive 
with ethnic and territorial boundaries. Making this neo-
imperial model legitimate in people’s eyes represented 
a serious challenge for elites, although it was deeply 
rooted in pre-revolutionary patterns and mentality. 
First, the successful imposition of such a model had to 
overcome social-structural and psychological obstacles. 
In particular, during Soviet ethnic mixing and migra-
tion, the boundaries between ethno-religious commu-
nities substantially disintegrated and lost their distinc-
tive character. Second, in spite of decades of atheism, 
religious conversions did not come to a total halt, 
which corroded the once solid connections between a 
particular religion and its corresponding ethnicity. Thus 
Orthodox Christians became Baptists, Muslims con-
verted to Lutheranism, and some even joined the In-
ternational Society of Krishna (Willems, 2007, p. 232). 
Finally, boundaries between religious communities 
were more often imagined than real because levels of 
religious belief, belonging, and behavior were quite low 
after years of atheism.  
To revive, inculcate, and disseminate the beliefs 
that ethnic and religious boundaries are essentially in-
tertwined, and that crossing these boundaries should 
be viewed with suspicion and be discouraged, a partic-
ular type of ideology was propagated. In my previous, 
co-authored work, the ideology is dubbed “eth-
nodoxy”, and conceptualized as a “belief system that 
rigidly links a group’s ethnic identity to its dominant re-
ligion and consequently tends to view other religions as 
potentially or actually harmful to the group’s unity and 
wellbeing and, therefore, seeks protected and privi-
leged status for the groups’ dominant faith” (Karpov & 
Lisovskaya, 2008, p. 370; Karpov, Lisovskaya, & Barry, 
2012, p. 644).  
It is in this context of limited pluralism—reverting 
to a neo-imperial regime of inter-faith relations, ethni-
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cization, territorial binding of religion, and propaganda 
of ethnodoxy—that the new Russian model of religious 
education is best understood. The structure and con-
tent of the new curriculum are functional within the 
neo-imperial model. First, it selectively privileges some 
religions and effectively excludes others. Second, it re-
tains the privileged status of Orthodoxy vis-à-vis other 
religions. Third, it promotes ethnodoxy by involuntarily 
including students in and excluding them from preas-
signed ethno-religious categories. Findings from my 
discourse analysis of the five modular textbooks and 
the teachers’ Manual show how these unarticulated 
goals are meant to be achieved. The analysis leads me 
to conclude that the ideas of the course are congruent 
with the neo-imperial ideology of the Russian state. Let 
us now turn to the analysis and its findings. 
8. Findings from Discourse Analysis 
8.1. Suppression of Exogenous Religious Pluralism 
The course obviously limits the range of studied reli-
gions to Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism. This 
range of inclusion and exclusion mirrors the restrictive 
1997 law. The ‘big four’ are taught in separate mod-
ules, and to each is devoted a specially developed text-
book.  No modules exist for non-Orthodox Christians.  
For the millions of Russian Protestants, no module ex-
ists on the Fundamentals of Protestant Culture.  No 
module exists for perhaps a million Russian Catholics, 
nor for the 1.5 million Armenian Apostolic Christians 
(numbers taken from Clay, 2015, p. 56). One of the 
course’s five modules covers the textbook, Fundamen-
tals of World Religious Cultures (FWRC). Here, one 
would expect to find other religions discussed. Howev-
er, this isn’t entirely the case. The FWRC textbook 
(Beglov et al., 2012) primarily focuses on the four tradi-
tional faiths; it mentions paganism in passing, and gives 
scant attention to Roman Catholicism, Western Protes-
tantism, and the Armenian Apostolic church. Presenta-
tion of these religions spans 1.3 pages out of the FWRC 
textbook’s 79 pages. Information about these non-
Orthodox branches of Christianity is scarce. Protestant-
ism is represented as one undifferentiated religion. In-
formation is often inaccurate and biased. Thus stu-
dents learn that the Orthodox Church was established 
after the Great Schism between Eastern and Western 
Christianity in the eleventh century. ‘Orthodox’ is 
translated as, “teaching about God correctly and truth-
fully” (pp. 46-47). The limited space of this article pre-
cludes a detailed analysis of these interpretations, yet 
it is clear that the textbook’s interpretations are histor-
ically and semantically inaccurate and and biased in fa-
vor of Orthodoxy. For example, the term ‘Orthodoxy’ 
hardly means ‘correct church’, and such a translation 
has an unfavorable connotation for other Christian 
churches.  
The course’s Teachers’ Manual (Tishkov & 
Shaposhnikova, 2011) reinforces these attitudes to-
wards non-Orthodox churches. Interestingly, the Man-
ual’s discussion of Roman Catholicism is lengthy and 
detailed, consuming 13 pages, which is comparable to 
its presentations of Judaism (17 pages) and Islam (22 
pages). However, it presents Catholicism as entirely for-
eign to Russia. The chapter on Catholicism gives no men-
tion of Catholicism or Catholics in Russia (pp. 102-116). 
The presentation of Protestantism spans 25 pages, and 
selectively identifies only four Protestant denomina-
tions—Lutherans, Seventh Day Adventists, Pentecostals, 
and Baptists (pp. 117-141); certainly, these four denom-
inations do not exhaust all Protestant groups in contem-
porary Russia. Given that Protestants constitute the 
third largest group of believers in modern Russia 
(Kozyrev & Fedorov, 2007, p. 135), 25 pages isn’t exactly 
excessive next to the 24 pages devoted to Orthodoxy. 
Like the Roman Catholic Church, the Lutheran Church is 
portrayed as foreign to Russia, even though it is Russia’s 
oldest and most influential Protestant denomination. 
Only ten lines at the end of the chapter are devoted to 
Lutheranism; these lines mention that the Lutheran 
Church was established in 1576, and was primarily at-
tended by people of Finnish and German origins (Tish-
kov & Shaposhnikova, 2011, p. 125), once again imply-
ing the ethnic boundaries of religious affiliation. At the 
same time, the Manual doesn’t indicate the rapidly 
growing numbers of Protestants in Russia; charismatic 
and Pentecostal Christians in Siberia and the Far East 
(Kozyrev & Fedorov, 2007, p. 135) largely reflect the 
conversions of ethnic Russians. Since these facts disa-
gree with the dominant ethnodoxy, they are ignored.  
The notion that ‘non-traditional’ faiths are funda-
mentally problematic is reinforced by the definition the 
Manual provides of ‘new’ religions. First, the Manual 
explains that ‘new’ religions are synonymous with 
‘non-traditional’ ones, and that they may include both 
emerging (recent) and re-emerging (historically old) re-
ligions (Tishkov & Shaposhnikova, 2011, p. 202). Alt-
hough this is not explicitly articulated in the Manual, 
such an understanding allows for categorizing Catholi-
cism and Protestantism as ‘new’ religions since they 
are re-emerging religions. Secondly, and more im-
portantly, the ‘new’ religions are described—in sharp 
contrast with ‘traditional’ ones—as less concerned 
with faith as such, and more concerned with earthly 
matters. They are said to be rooted in the emotional 
and psychological aspects of faith rather than its doc-
trinal dimensions, and as appealing to young people’s 
desires to belong to a collectivity of like-minded peo-
ple, as well as to their immature susceptibility to peer 
pressure (pp. 204-207). Making ‘non-traditional’ (or 
‘new’) religions even less attractive, the Manual cites 
the document accepted at the Hierarchical Council of 
the ROC in 1994, which declares all ‘new’ religions “in-
compatible with Christianity” (p. 210).  
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8.2. Suppression of Endogenous Pluralism 
Suppression of endogenous pluralism is similarly 
achieved through inclusion of the ‘right’ and exclusion 
of the ‘wrong’ factions and currents within confessions. 
We have already seen that Christianity is discussed in a 
very limited way in the World Religions textbook and in 
the Manual. All other textbooks give little if any atten-
tion to religious diversity within faiths. Thus, the text-
book on Orthodox Culture heavily focuses on a generic 
type of Russian Orthodoxy. Not a single Orthodox 
group outside of the ROC MP is mentioned. Students 
will learn nothing about the Old Believers and Russian 
Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (formerly in Exile), 
let alone the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox 
Church, or the Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate 
that broke from the ROC. 
Similarly, while the textbook on Islam (Latyshina & 
Murtazin, 2012) rightly calls Islam a “world religion” and 
mentions that there are 1.5 billion Muslims on the plan-
et (p. 6), it bypasses the enormous diversity within Islam. 
It neither discusses nor mentions the Shia-Sunni split, 
Sufism, Ahmadiyya, or other currents. The Teacher’s 
Manual is equally silent on the issue of Islamic diversity. 
In a remarkable contrast, textbooks on Buddhist 
(Chimitdorzhiev, 2012) and Judaic Cultures (Chlenov et 
al., 2012) acknowledge internal religious diversity and 
different interpretations within the faiths. Buddhism is 
represented by three teachings—Theravada, Mahayana, 
and Gelug (or Gelukpa). None of the three—including 
Gelug, the most common strand in Russia—is described 
as more truthful or better than the others 
(Chimitdorzhiev, 2012, p. 32). Similarly, the Judaic Cul-
ture textbook discusses Orthodox, Conservative, and Re-
formed Judaism, as well as Hassidism. Although its in-
terpretation of Reformed Judaism as “simplifying” and 
“distancing from Orthodox Judaism” (Chlenov et al., 
2012, p. 56) possesses a disapproving connotation, this 
textbook is the only one of the five that gives a definition 
of religious tolerance (veroterpimost’) as “acceptance of 
the right of other faiths to exist freely” (p. 7). 
8.3. Ethnodoxy 
All textbooks on religious cultures mention the histori-
cal connections between nationalities (ethnicities) and 
particular religions. However, not all represent this 
connection as rigid and inseparable. Ethnodoxy is par-
ticularly strong in the textbooks on Orthodox and Is-
lamic cultures. The first textbook on Orthodox culture 
by Borodina (2002) presented Orthodoxy as insepara-
ble from Russianness and Slavic ancestry (Shnirelman, 
2012, p. 264). The 2012 Orthodox Culture textbook 
strengthens this connection. Students are taught that a 
person “does not typically choose his/her culture. They 
are born into it, breathe it, and grow within it” (Kuraev, 
2012, p. 6). The textbook instructs that, to properly 
understand “all that is connected to the world of reli-
gion,” students should look inside their souls and to 
“feel its connection to Motherland [i.e., to Russia—
E.L.]” (p. 32). Although the textbook is supposed to be 
about Orthodox culture in general, it represents Or-
thodoxy as an essentially Russian phenomenon. It pro-
vides no distinction between the Orthodox Church 
proper and the Russian Orthodox Church as a particu-
lar embodiment of Orthodoxy. In this sense, the text-
book is on Russian Orthodoxy, not on Orthodox cul-
ture. For example, it admits that in “Orthodox Church 
prayer and sermon may be in languages other than 
Russian.” However, immediately after this concession, 
it suggests that the “Russian [emphasis mine] Orthodox 
Church prays in Japanese, English, German and many 
other languages” (p. 54).  By doing so, the textbook 
subtly implies that all Orthodox churches—regardless 
of the language in which they conduct services—fall 
under the jurisdiction of the ROC MP. Why a service 
conducted in English does not belong to the American 
Orthodox Church, or why Greek services do not belong 
to the Greek Orthodox Church is left unexplained. In 
the fine print, it admits that other Orthodox Christians 
exist in “Bulgaria, Serbia, and Czech Republic” (p. 54). 
Yet the range of “other countries” is limited to these 
three Slavic nations, leaving aside the rest of the world, 
where Orthodoxy was introduced much earlier or took 
root later. Especially salient, the overtly Russian nature 
of what is presented as Orthodoxy manifests itself in 
how the textbook describes Easter. Although Easter is a 
common feast for all Christians, the textbook uses the 
concept ‘Russian Easter’ interchangeably with the con-
cept ‘Christian Easter,’ thus implying that specifically 
Russian traditions for celebrating Easter are the same 
traditions celebrated by the whole of Christendom (pp. 
29-31) .  
The link between Orthodoxy and Russianness is fur-
ther emphasized in the story of the tenth century bap-
tism of the people of Kyivan Rus’, which is recounted in 
both the Orthodox and World Religious Cultures text-
books. This adaptation is done entirely in the spirit of 
cultural-imperialist appropriation; the Kyivan Rus’ is 
appropriated as Kyivan Russia, even though the former 
is also the cradle of the Ukrainian and Belarusian cul-
tures and nations, and even though Ukrainian Greco-
Catholics legitimately trace their roots to the times of 
acceptance of Orthodoxy by ancient Rus’. Such an im-
perialist appropriation of Rus’ is by no means novel. 
Appropriation is part of the Russian religious national-
ism that has been cultivated since the second half of 
the nineteenth century, and resurged in Russia after 
the collapse of communism. This ideology is clearly 
present in both the Orthodox and World Religious Cul-
ture textbooks. Both textbooks (Kuraev, 2012, and 
Beglov et al., 2012) blur the distinction between Rus-
sians and the people of the Rus’. The texts consistently 
refer to the people of Kyivan Rus’—its princes Vladimir 
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and Jaroslav, and their ambassadors to Constantino-
ple—as ‘Russians’ (russkie) (Beglov et al., 2012, p. 42; 
Kuraev, 2012, p. 59). Further, the textbooks represent 
the adoption of “Orthodoxy” (which, strictly speaking, 
did not exist as a confession at the time of baptism of 
Rus’ in 988 A.D.) as the starting point for the estab-
lishment of ‘Holy Russia,’ a mythologeme that has oc-
cupied a central role in Russian religious nationalism 
and imperialism from the Tsarist times to the annexa-
tion of Crimea in 2014. Let us note that—in this re-
gard—the textbooks’ ideas have become congruent 
with the neo-imperialist ideology that has been culti-
vated in Russia and used to justify its openly expan-
sionist aspirations. The Orthodox Culture textbook ex-
plains the meaning of ‘Holy Russia’ as the Russian 
people’s “search for holiness” (Kuraev, 2012, p. 60). It 
notes that “high appeals of the Gospel found a quick 
response among Russian people after they had been 
baptized” (p. 59). This all sounds as if the people of 
Rus’ (read ‘Russians’) were predestined to become Or-
thodox believers, and that no other faith could possibly 
match “the Russian soul” or Russian worldview. From 
these presentations, students are likely to learn that 
being ethnically Russian means being Orthodox—as if 
by birth—and that being Orthodox ultimately means 
being Russian.  
Finally, this belief is enhanced by the overall aes-
thetics of the Orthodox Culture textbook. All illustra-
tions and photographs represent Russian churches, 
Russian icons, Russian art, or stereotypically Russian 
individuals. There are fifteen photographs of lay people 
in the textbook in which the photographed persons’ fa-
cial features are clearly recognizable. All are stereo-
typically Russian (or at least Slavic), with blond hair, 
beards or braids, and blue eyes. No Asian-looking (e.g., 
Tatar or Yakut) physiques or features can be found 
among the pictures. Moreover, to reinforce attribution 
of Orthodoxy to the Russian land, the textbook liberally 
uses appropriate imagery—both visual and verbal—of 
typical Russian nature and landscapes. For example, a 
lengthy excerpt from Solzhenitsyn narrates that the 
“Orthodox churches and bell towers are the key for 
understanding the conciliatory nature of Russian land-
scape….In these very bell towers our ancestors had in-
vested the best of them, all their understanding of the 
meaning of life” (Kuraev, 2012, p. 61).  
The Islamic Culture textbook is no less permeated 
with ethnodoxy. Throughout the text, the word ‘Mus-
lim’ and ethnic markers are used interchangeably. For 
example, in the lesson on customs and morals, it is 
noted that “Muslims are very hospitable. If you happen 
to be a guest in the house of a mountaineer, such as an 
Ingush, Chechen, or Avar”, you will be given everything 
you need (Latyshina & Murtazin, 2012, p. 67). Similarly, 
heroic acts of “Muslim people” in times of war or 
peace are discussed as the “heroism of Bashkir or Da-
gestani people” (p. 55). Three examples of “Muslim he-
roes” are remarkable in this sense. One is Musa 
Dzhalil’, a Soviet poet who died in a Nazi camp. Anoth-
er is Abdul Khakim Ismailov, a soldier, one of those 
who erected the Soviet banner over Reichstag in May 
of 1945. The third is Makhmud Esambaev, a famous 
dancer in the Soviet Union. Who were these people? 
Dzhalil’ and Ismailov were members of the Communist 
Party of the USSR. All three were recipients of numer-
ous Soviet-time governmental awards, and experi-
enced the peak of their popularity under Soviet athe-
ism. However, the textbook unequivocally labels them 
‘Muslims.’  This labelling is done posthumously, and 
thus ascribes religious identity arbitrarily (pp. 54-57). 
What, then, makes them Muslim? The answer is clear. 
The only aspect that makes these heroes Muslim is 
their membership in traditionally Islamic ethnicities—
one was a Tatar, another Dagestani, and the last Che-
chen. Thus, the students are subtly but surely forced to 
develop a rigid connection between ethnic and reli-
gious identity. 
Of the five textbooks, the ones on Judaic and Bud-
dhist cultures show the least evidence of ethnodoxy. 
Moreover, they include a number of anti-ethnodox 
statements. Both FJC and FBC emphasize the global 
reach of Judaism and Buddhism, and do not necessarily 
relate these religions to particular ethnicities or geo-
graphic territories.  Statements like these typify the 
textbooks’ content: 
“millions of people in various countries glorify Bud-
dha.” (Chimitdorzhiev, 2012, p. 8)  
“Buddhist rituals emerged and developed under the 
influence of traditions and customs of various peo-
ples, different in their culture, language and life-
style.” (p. 52) 
Similarly, the Judaic Culture textbook shows a low or 
non-existent level of ethnodoxy. The text differentiates 
between ‘religious’ and ‘non-religious’ Jews, and sug-
gests that one does not have to be religious to be con-
sidered an ethnic Jew (Chlenov et al., 2012, p. 7). By so 
saying, the text suggests that the religious marker of 
Jewishness is not rigidly attached to its ethnic marker. 
Moreover, by suggesting that members of any ethnicity 
who pass an exam may become a Jew in religious 
terms (p. 67), the textbook paints the ethno-religious 
boundary as permeable. However, it is permeable in 
only one direction. Ethnicity does not presuppose relig-
iosity, but acceptance of Judaism automatically in-
cludes one in the “Jewish people” (p. 7). Thus, students 
of the Judaic culture textbook receive a mixed message 
on the link between ethnicity and religion. The ethno-
religious boundary seems to work as a one-way street, 
i.e., religion assumes ethnicity, but not the other way 
around. Let us note, however, that while this represen-
tation only partly fits our definition of ethnodoxy, eth-
 Social Inclusion, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 2, Pages 117-132 129 
nodoxy itself is a foundational dogma within Judaism. It 
reflects an essential dogma of Judaism rather than an 
ideological interpretation of the faith. 
8.4. Hierarchy of Religions 
As mentioned above, the idea of the hierarchy of reli-
gions is central to the neo-imperial model of dealing 
with religious diversity, and is clearly reinforced by the 
textbooks discussed. These textbooks put the ROC at 
the top of the religious hierarchy. The textbooks do not 
say this directly. However, the notion is promoted 
through how they represent each religion’s relation to 
the Russian state. Therefore, it is remarkable that each 
textbook glorifies the role of the state in the historical 
and contemporary development of the faith it discuss-
es. Yet each faith’s position in the hierarchy of religions 
becomes obvious through what the textbooks specifi-
cally do or do not say about the Russian state. Unsur-
prisingly, representations of how the ROC stands vis-à-
vis the state unmistakably indicate that the Church 
possesses a much higher status than Islam, Buddhism, 
or Judaism. For example, only the FWRC textbook re-
counts some of the historical faults of the state to-
wards the Orthodox Church, such as Peter the Great’s 
abolition of the institution of Patriarchate (Beglov et 
al., 2012, p. 46). The ROC is depicted as a victim of ill-
treatment by the state, on the one hand, and as an im-
portant player in the history of Russian society on the 
other. Thus Orthodoxy emerges as an invariably posi-
tive force, while the state is portrayed as capable of in-
justices (albeit only past and limited ones). Yet any his-
torical injustices by the state towards minority religions 
have been totally omitted from the textbooks. Moreo-
ver, the Judaic and Buddhist culture textbooks not only 
gloss over all instances of mistreatment by the state, 
but also ignore the positive contributions of Judaism 
and Buddhism to the Russian state and society. When 
speaking of the Russian State, the textbooks express 
only gratitude. For example, the Buddhist culture text-
book thanks Elisabeth II for officially recognizing that 
Buddhism existed in Russia in 1741 (Chimitdorzhiev, 
2012, p. 38). The textbook emphasizes that a temple in 
Buryatia was built in memory of Russia’s victory over 
Napoleon in 1812 (p. 64). The Judaic Culture textbook 
gratefully brings up the February Revolution of 1917, 
which “removed all forms of inequality of Jews as citi-
zens and made Judaism equal with all other religions in 
the country” (Chlenov et al., 2012, p. 48). Not a word 
of criticism of the state policy against Buddhists or the 
state-supported anti-Semitism is uttered. Islam seems 
to construe its status somewhere between—on the 
one hand—Buddhism and Judaism and—on the oth-
er—Orthodoxy. The Islamic culture textbook neither 
praises the Russian State for its support, nor blames it 
for any ill-treatment of Islam or Muslims. Yet, similarly 
to the Orthodox culture text, it strongly emphasizes the 
contributions of Islam to Russian culture (Latyshina & 
Murtazin, 2012, pp. 52-53). In sum, Orthodoxy has an 
invariably positive image, and was unjustly treated by 
the state. Islam contributed positively to Russia, but 
the textbook mentions no state injustices against Mus-
lims. Finally, Judaism and Buddhism are thankful recip-
ients of state favors, yet none of the religions’ positive 
contributions are mentioned.  
Thus, the textbooks’ content demonstrates that the 
ROC is entitled to boast not only of its contributions to 
the Russian state and nation, but also to remember 
that it was once hurt by it. Islam is not entitled to re-
member any wounds, but is allowed to claim its contri-
butions. Buddhism and Judaism may only thank the 
state for its favors. The hierarchy that transpires is very 
clear. I conclude that, by means of these representa-
tions, the studied textbooks approve the existing hierar-
chical relationships between religions and vis-à-vis the 
state. Such approval provides ideological support to the 
neo-imperial model of religious toleration in the context 
of—to use Motyl’s definition of empires—“structurally 
centralized political system[s] within which core states 
and elites [including the ROC MP elites—E.L.] dominate 
peripheral societies” (1999, p. 126). 
9. Conclusion 
We have seen that the content of the textbooks de-
signed for the religious education of Russian students 
exhibits a specific constellation of ideological charac-
teristics. These include bypassing the reality of exoge-
nous and—in the cases of Orthodox and Islamic text-
books—endogenous pluralism. Furthermore, the 
textbooks on Orthodox and Islamic cultures—whose 
combined target audience accounts for the vast majori-
ty of Russia’s students—promote the ideology of eth-
nodoxy, which rigidly links religion to ethnicity and 
leads to negative perceptions of ethnically “alien” 
faiths. Moreover, the Orthodox Culture textbook em-
ploys mythologemes and interpretations that have 
been historically central to Russian religious national-
ism and imperialism, and that are congruent with the 
neo-imperialist expansionism of Russia’s current lead-
ership and its dominant ideology. Finally, the textbooks 
perpetuate the notion of an imperial, state domination 
of religious minorities, as well as a hierarchy of reli-
gions in which the ROC MP sits at the top. These find-
ings indicate the function that religious education is 
supposed to fulfill in contemporary Russia. The mani-
festly proclaimed goals of religious education appear 
convergent with the values of religious freedom, self-
determination, tolerance, and inter-faith peace that 
are espoused by Western liberal democracies. Yet the 
hidden curriculum of religious education that shows in 
this constellation of ideological characteristics is far 
more consistent with a neo-imperial model of an eth-
no-religious hegemony (of Russian Orthodoxy) and 
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with limited toleration of selected faiths whose reach is 
supposedly restricted to politically peripheral ethno-
territorial entities. This model embodies and revitalizes 
Russia’s imperial legacies. Yet this revitalization is in it-
self an outcome of strategic choices made by the coun-
try’s religious and secular elites.  
As was mentioned above, the neo-imperial model 
emerged as a result of a lengthy process that involved 
intense contestation and political struggle. However, in 
the current, increasingly authoritarian political atmos-
phere, any further contestation of the neo-imperial 
model of ethno-religious hegemony has been shunned.  
Yet no matter how much the new model resonates 
with Russia’s imperial traditions and current authori-
tarianism, it may be a short-lived creation. Social and 
geographic mobility in today’s Russia undermines eth-
no-territorial approaches to religious pluralism. The 
suppression of pro-independence movements in Rus-
sian regions requires resources of which Russia may 
run out in the not so distant future. The “vertical of 
power” that has enforced the hierarchy of religions 
may crumble as a result of economic and socio-political 
challenges. And, finally, globalization leads to a rapid 
growth of religious diversity, and undermines tradi-
tional, imperial approaches. Under these circumstanc-
es—and if it wishes to preserve itself as a unified politi-
cal entity—Russia must adopt a much more 
consistently pluralistic and non-hegemonic model of 
religious education.  
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